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"But, I don't understand that. You put something there; I do not feel anything and 
yet I got there with my finger. How does that happen?"1  
 
Introduction 
The enactive approach rejects the classical computational dichotomy between perception 
and action.2 Perception is not merely a means to action and action a means to perception. 
Instead, the proponents of the enactive approach argue for a stronger relation of constitutive 
interdependence. On this view, perceptual content constitutively depends on law-like 
relationships that hold between sensory input and motor output. Hence, perceptual 
experiences are said to be inseparable from the perceiver’s bodily activities.  
Touch is taken by the enactive approach as paradigmatic of perception because the content 
of one’s tactile perception of the shape of an object is said to be constitutively determined by 
the action of exploring it with one’s fingers. 
“All perception is touch-like in this way: perceptual experience acquires content 
thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what 
we do (or what we know how to do).” Noë (2004, p. 1) 
“Touch acquires spatial content — comes to represent spatial qualities — thanks to 
the ways touch is linked to movement and to our implicit understanding of the 
                                                
1 Report of a patient suffering from numbsense in J. Paillard, F. Michel and G. Stelmach, “Localization without 
content: a tactile analogue of 'blind sight'”, Archives of-Neurology, 40 (1983), p.550.  
2 This view has been defended by, among others, Susan Hurley in Consciousness in Action (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1998); Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, “A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness”, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 24, 5 (2001): 939-101; Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2004). Evan Thompson, “Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience”, Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences. 4 (2005): 407-427. 
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relevant tactile-motor dependencies governing our interaction with objects.” idem, 
p. 205 
Although it is vision that has received the most attention, it seems indeed that the enactive 
approach is more likely to be true of tactile experiences than those of any other senses (e.g., 
gustatory experiences). For instance, in haptic touch, the tactile system is not a passive 
recipient of bodily information, and consists in exploratory activities. However, what may be 
true for haptic touch, which is intrinsically active, may be more controversial for passive 
touch (e.g., the sensation of a mosquito on your skin). If touch is to be the model for all 
perception, or at least the less controversial application of the enactive approach, then it is 
worth a more thorough examination.  
After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the 
difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical. I shall conclude that what we do 
does not determine what we feel. 
 
1. The agenda for an enactive approach to tactile experiences 
What is at the core of the enactive theories is the dynamic constitutive relationship 
between sensory input and motor output. On this view, we are able to keep track of the 
interdependence between the sensory input and the motor output, this ability being grounded 
in the procedural knowledge of how the way one moves affects the sensory signals that one 
receives (or how the movement of objects will affect those signals). In this sense, Hurley 
talked of “active perception” and Noë describes perception as an “embodied activity”.  
One should, however, acknowledge the diversity of views that enactivism includes. There 
is indeed little agreement among the proponents of the enactive approach beyond the claim of 
the interdependence of perception and action. One noteworthy difference is the variety of 
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explananda of the enactive views.  There are at least three aspects that are thought to require 
an account in enactive terms: (i) the individuation of perceptual modalities (e.g. sight vs. 
audition); (ii) perceptual phenomenology (i.e. what it is like to perceive) and (iii) perceptual 
content (i.e. representational content). First, it has been argued that each sensory modality 
depends on its own specific patterns of dynamic interdependence between sensory stimulation 
and movements. The set of patterns differs depending on whether one is seeing or touching an 
object for instance, and as such it would individuate the various sensory modalities, e.g. 
distinguish sight from audition. Second, some versions of the enactive approach claim to 
account for consciousness, and more precisely for the qualitative phenomenology of 
perceptual experiences. For instance, what it is like to see a red tomato would consist in the 
procedural knowledge of the sensory effects of one’s movements relative to the light. Finally, 
most enactive theories aim at explaining the intentional content of perceptual experiences, and 
more particularly how perceptual experiences represent spatial properties. Seeing that the 
table is round is to know that it looks more or less elliptical depending on where one is 
relative to the table.   
Here I am not interested in the idiosyncrasies of the various enactive approaches.3 Rather I 
shall propose different ways to spell out the enactive view of tactile experiences and focus on 
the most plausible ones. Following the distinctions above, an enactivist for tactile experiences 
can pursue the following aims: (i) to individuate the tactile modality (e.g., a tactile experience, 
by contrast with a visual one); (ii) to explain the phenomenology of tactile sensations (e.g., 
the conscious sensation of pressure on my skin); (iii) to explain the spatial content of tactile 
experiences (e.g., the sensation that there is an object touching me on my palm that is round). 
In the last case, the enactivist shall have to take into account the duality of the content of 
                                                
3 For a review of the differences between versions of the enactive theory of vision, see Gangopadhyay and 
Kiverstein, “Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action”, Topoi, 28 (2009): 63–73. 
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tactile experiences. By contrast with other sensory modalities, touch is both about the external 
world with which one is in contact and about one’s body that is in contact with the external 
world. Hence, an enactive account of tactile experiences must accommodate both 
exteroceptive content and interoceptive content. 
To add to the complexity, touch is a very comprehensive term, so much so that one may 
even deny that it refers to a unique sensory modality. On the one hand, there is active touch. It 
is primarily defined by movements of the body part that is in contact with an object. The 
movements can be of three types. Some are merely passive movements (e.g., your hand is 
moved by another individual). Some are exploratory movements, voluntarily initiated by the 
perceiver (e.g., you follow the contours of the object). Some are effortful movements (e.g., 
you lift and manipulate an object with muscular effort). On the other hand, there is passive 
touch, which is merely cutaneous. Here again, one may distinguish between static passive 
touch (e.g., the pressure of the cat on your knees) and kinematic passive touch (e.g., the 
motion of the mosquito on your skin).   
In virtue of their interoceptive content, tactile experiences are partly bodily experiences, 
or in more enactive terms, embodied. However, what matters for the enactive approach is not 
so much the embodiment of perception as its intrinsic relation with action. And it is 
controversial whether tactile experiences consist in an embodied activity. True, in haptic 
touch, I move my body to retrieve information about an object when needed and the 
movements of my hand over a surface induce shifting sensations. But can one generalize the 
enactive account of haptic experiences to any kind of tactile experiences, and more generally 
to bodily experiences? How can the so-called passive touch be active? 
Here I shall attempt to apply the enactive approach to instantaneous passive touch, which 
seems to be the most challenging case. Let us imagine that I consciously feel a short non-
painful tap on my knee. The content of my experience is not very rich. I may not even be able 
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to know what touched me. Yet, I feel that I was briefly touched on my knee, and not anywhere 
else. What grounds my phenomenology and the spatial content of my tactile experience? If 
one succeeds in offering an enactive account of such an impoverished tactile experience, then 
there is a good chance that one can offer a more general enactive account of bodily 
experiences. Let us see now how this might work. We shall see that the task is not easy.  
 
2. Tactile-motor expectations  
Visual experiences are said to depend on eye movements, and haptic touch on exploratory 
hand movements. But I do not need to move to have a tactile experience, as is the case in 
passive touch. Yet, a proponent of the enactive approach may claim that even in passive 
touch, one masters the procedural knowledge of the tactile consequences of potential 
movements (i.e. sensorimotor contingencies). What matters is not the bodily exercise of 
procedural knowledge, but its mere possession. For instance, itching sensations would consist 
in the knowledge that if one scratches where one has been bitten by the mosquito, the 
stimulation would decrease. One does not need to scratch one’s leg, it suffices that one knows 
the consequences of doing so. The same could be said for tactile experiences. What would 
constitute tactile experiences is not what you do, but what you expect to feel if you do it. But 
what kind of procedural knowledge is constitutive of passive touch?  
Let me start with two possible tactile-motor expectations.4  
(1) If I remove my knee from the object it is in contact with, I shall stop receiving 
tactile signals.  
(2) If I remove the object with my hand, I shall stop receiving tactile signals.  
                                                
4 Many questions have been raised on the specific nature of sensorimotor knowledge (for full review in the case 
of visual experiences, see the commentaries in O’Regan & Noë, 2001).  Here I shall not insist on these general 
difficulties about the enactive account, but focus on specific problems raised by tactile-motor knowledge. 
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As basic and uncontroversial as these tactile-motor expectations are, they raise several 
worries. The closest equivalent in vision would be the expectation that if I close my eyes, I 
will no longer receive visual signals. Nobody in the computational community would ever 
deny this simple relation of causal dependence between vision and eye opening/closing, or 
between touch and bodily contact. However, not all causal relations between touch and action 
are of interest for the enactive view. According to Hurley, the interdependence of perception 
and action can be of two kinds. It is instrumental when action is just a means to perception. It 
is non-instrumental when perception wholly or partly consists in action. Only the latter kind is 
relevant for the enactive approach. The question then is which kind the sensorimotor 
expectations (1) and (2) belong to: instrumental or non-instrumental. In vision, the movement 
of eye opening/closing makes the visual experience possible or not, but this is a feature of any 
kind of visual experience. I could see a red tomato or a yellow lemon for all it matters. As 
such, it cannot determine the specific phenomenology and the specific content of the visual 
experience that results from my opening my eyes. Similarly in touch, the movement of 
separating the body part from the object (or getting it into contact with the object) stops the 
tactile experience, but it would stop any kind of tactile experience, whether I feel a rough 
texture or a smooth one. Hence, it cannot be an individuative condition of the phenomenology 
of my tactile experience nor of its descriptive content. At most, this type of sensorimotor 
contingency may individuate the sensory modality: vision would constitutively require 
stopping the flow of information by closing the eyes, and touch would constitutively require 
stopping the flow of information by retrieving the body part in contact with the object. Yet, it 
seems that most enactive proponents want more. 
They may for instance argue that the tactile-motor contingency (1) can individuate at least 
the bodily spatial content, which is at the core of our interests. Indeed, it is only if I remove 
my knee from the object it is in contact with that I can expect the tactile signal to stop, and not 
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any other body part. The tactile-motor contingency is body-part specific, and as such might 
provide the bodily spatial content. But how do I know that it is my knee that I need to move?  
There is a threat of circularity, which is similar to the one highlighted by Jacob (2008) in the 
case of vision.5 The enactive account claims that visuo-motor knowledge consists in the 
knowledge of how one’s movements toward a visually seen object affect the way one 
perceives the object. But Jacob notices that in order to act upon an object, one needs first to be 
able to single it out, to pick it out from other objects. Hence, visuo-motor knowledge cannot 
allow one to individuate the relevant object. There must be another part to the story, which 
cannot be told in enactivist terms. Similarly, in the tactile case, it is not clear how one can 
individuate the body part on the basis of tactile-motor contingencies without similarly falling 
into circularity. The tactile-motor knowledge requires a prior and independent way of singling 
out the relevant body part that is in contact with the object, if one wants to avoid a circular 
account of the bodily spatial content.   
The tactile-motor expectations (1) and (2) do not work if they are supposed to constitute 
the phenomenology or the content of tactile experiences. But the problem is more 
fundamental, and not limited to these two specific examples. To give an enactive account of 
the content of tactile experiences is indeed difficult, especially the interoceptive content. On 
some enactive views, what is constitutive of the content of perceptual experience is the 
procedural knowledge that gives access to objective properties based on the relation between 
the experience of perspectival properties and bodily activities. For instance, the table is round 
(i.e. objective property of the stimulus, which is independent of the perceiver), but it appears 
to you as being elliptical (i.e. perspectival property which is the way the stimulus appears to 
you). According to this enactive theory, your visual experience represents the table as round 
                                                
5 Pierre Jacob, “The scope and limits of the enactive approaches to visual experiences”. Perception, 47 (2008): 
446-461. 
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because you know how its perspectival property would change depending on how you move 
relative to the object (e.g., you get closer to the table). However, it is hard to see on this 
account how there could be any kind of dependency between touch and action, as far as the 
interoceptive content of touch is concerned. When I feel the tap on my knee, it does not seem 
to make sense to distinguish between a perspectival bodily property and an objective bodily 
property, if perspectival properties depend on the spatial relation between the perceiver and 
the object. If the object is one’s own body, then it cannot be blocked from tactile perception, 
nor can one change one’s spatial relations to it. In other words, one cannot change the spatial 
conditions under which one’s own body is felt. And if one cannot change the spatial 
conditions, then there is no corresponding tactile-motor knowledge of the way the 
perspectival properties would change depending on the way one moves relative to one’s body. 
Faced with this difficulty, the proponents of the enactive view have two choices: either to 
restrict their account to the exteroceptive content of tactile experiences or to offer an 
alternative type of enactive account of the interoceptive content that differs from the one 
provided for the exteroceptive content.  
Finally, even if the tactile-motor contingencies outlined above were satisfactory, they 
could not work for every kind of touch, and so they fail to satisfy the enactive agenda. For 
example, they cannot be easily applied to instantaneous touch. When I receive a brief tap on 
my knee, I cannot remove my knee from the object (or remove the object from my knee) 
because the object is already gone. And if I do so, there will be no difference in tactile 
stimulation because the tactile signal has already stopped. More generally, it is difficult to 
imagine the interdependence of perception and action, when perception is so temporary that it 
does not afford the time to act. Most sensorimotor expectations require enduring perceptual 
experiences to make sense. If the object is no longer present, there cannot be any perceptual 
consequences. Hence, there cannot be any sensorimotor contingencies. If this is true, then 
 10 
there is no possible enactive account of instantaneous tactile experiences (or of any other kind 
of instantaneous perceptual experience).  
The only way out is to include not only sensorimotor knowledge, but also mere motor 
knowledge in the enactive account. One may indeed argue that it does not matter that I am too 
late in removing my knee from the object that briefly touched me. The action does not even 
need to be performed; it merely needs to be triggered by the tactile signal. The urge to move 
would constitute the perceptual experience, independently of its bodily execution, its sensory 
feedback, and the remaining presence of the sensory input that elicited it. Procedural 
knowledge does not require that the object that it applies to still exists. Let us imagine that 
you are telling me about a restaurant that you really used to like, which closed recently. If I 
ask you where the restaurant was, you may still know how to get there (although the 
restaurant is no longer there). Similarly, I can still act toward the location of the tactile 
stimulus, although the stimulus is no longer available. Feeling that I was briefly touched on 
the knee is for me knowing how to get to where I was touched. 6 On this view, the spatial 
content of the tactile experience that I was touched on the knee is determined by the 
procedural knowledge of how to get to the bodily location of the tactile stimulation. Hereafter 
I shall refer to this type of procedural knowledge as ‘spatial know-how’. Accounts in terms of 
spatial know-how sound like a plausible working hypothesis for the enactive approach for two 
reasons.7 On the one hand, this kind of procedural knowledge seems to be consistent with the 
                                                
6 If I reach the body location that was touched and put my finger on it, then I shall receive tactile signals from 
the same place. In this latter case, there would be tactile consequences. 
7 However, one may argue that the spatial content of bodily experiences must be determined by the 
movements performed by the specific body part that is experienced. For instance, the tactile experience of my 
knee being touched should be determined by the movements of my knee only. On the contrary, pointing and 
reaching movements are performed with a body part that is not represented in the tactile content, namely, the 
hand. Should this type of movement be discounted for this reason? This would be too restrictive. Most of the 
actions that one can perform towards one’s body are hand movements, and if one discounts them as irrelevant, 
then there are not many movements that are left over. Furthermore, there are some body parts that are not 
movable, and yet, we can experience them being touched. Therefore, one might suggest that the spatial content 
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enactive view (“What we perceive is determined by (…) what we know how to do” Noë, 
2004). On the other hand, I do not see any alternative type of procedural knowledge that could 
constitute instantaneous passive touch.8 
To sum up, the link between touch and bodily activity is supposed to be so obvious that it 
does not deserve a proper investigation and it should help us to better understand the enactive 
view of vision. However, this might be true for haptic touch only, and only for the 
exteroceptive content. The enactivists still need to give a specific account of the relationship 
between tactile experiences and action in the case of instantaneous passive touch, and this is 
not an easy task. They may argue that it is precisely because the relation with action is so 
weak that the content of such tactile experiences is so poor. That might be true. Nonetheless, 
for the enactive account to be true, there needs to be at least one type of law-like relation with 
action if there is to be tactile experience at all. I suggest that the most plausible way to spell 
out an enactive account of tactile content is in terms of reaching movements made toward the 
bodily location that was touched. However, we shall see now that this view faces severe 
difficulties when confronted with the empirical literature on bodily experiences. Instead of the 
interdependence of action and tactile experiences, I shall show that they are independent, and 
that they can be dissociated in both pathological and normal cases. 
 
3. Dissociating bodily experiences and spatial know-how 
                                                                                                                                                   
of the tactile experience depends on the procedural knowledge of the body part that is touched with respect to the 
rest of the body.   
8 The enactive view in terms of spatial know-how may look close to Anscombe’s dispositional theory of 
bodily sensations. The difference, however, is that the enactive view aims at accounting for the spatial content of 
bodily experiences. By contrast, Anscombe assumes that bodily sensations are not intrinsically spatial, and as 
such, they cannot have any spatial content. Yet, some of the arguments presented here can be seen as objections 
against Anscombe’s view as well. 
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One of the most recurrent and powerful empirical counterarguments provided against the 
enactive approach to vision comes from the neuropsychological dissociations between optic 
ataxia and visual agnosia.9 For example, the visual agnostic patient DF was presented with a 
set of various squares and rectangles. She was at chance when required to match the width of 
such simple geometrical forms by scaling the distance between her thumb and index finger 
(i.e. manual, non-verbal report).10 By contrast, she was accurately able to grasp the blocks. 
The reverse pattern of performance was found in optic ataxic patients. The conclusion drawn 
from such double dissociation is that one can have visual experiences of an object without 
being able to act towards this object, and vice-versa. That is, visual awareness can operate 
independently of visually-guided actions. A similar line of evidence against the enactive 
approach to vision comes from healthy individuals. It was found that action can be immune to 
visual illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, the Ponzo illusion, the Titchener illusion or 
the Hollow Face illusion. For example, the Hollow Face illusion is a visual illusion, in which 
the perception of a concave (or hollow) mask of a face appears as a normal convex (or 
protruding) face. It was found that if asked to quickly flick a magnet off the nose (as if it were 
a small insect), participants did not direct their finger movements to where the nose appeared 
to them (i.e. the protruding nose). They directed them to the actual location of the target in the 
hollow face, which was 8 inches away from the apparent location. In other words, the content 
of the visual experience of the face does not correspond to the visually-guided movements 
                                                
9 For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature that supports what is called the Perception-Action 
model of vision, see David Milner and Mel Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995 and Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, the Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. For an extensive discussion of the relevance of this type of empirical 
evidence for the enactive approach, see Pierre Jacob (2008), Ned Block, “Review of Alva Noë, Action in 
Perception”, The Journal of Philosophy, CII (2005): 259-272; Andy Clark, Supersizing the mind. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.  
10 Some hand movements can count as perceptual reports. For instance, it was shown that the underlying 
processes of scaling the distance between thumb and index finger are very different, whether it is for reporting a 
perceptual judgment or for a visuomotor task of grasping (Marc Jeannerod, The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Action. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
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directed toward the face. This was taken as evidence that the content of visual experiences 
(e.g., convex face) is at variance with the content of action-oriented vision (e.g., hollow face). 
What we see is not determined by what we do, or what we know how to do.  
Is there any equivalent type of empirical evidence against the enactive view of bodily 
experiences? The reply is yes.11 On the basis of dissociations between tactile and 
proprioceptive experiences on the one hand, and spatial know-how on the other hand, both in 
patients and in healthy individuals, I shall argue against the enactive view of (i) the 
phenomenology of bodily sensations, and (ii) the spatial content of bodily experiences.  
 
3.1 Action without sensation 
A patient is amazed at her own ability while blindfolded to point to where she was 
touched on her hand while she felt absolutely no sensation of having been touched (see 
introduction). This patient suffers from what is called ‘numbsense’ in the neuropsychological 
literature (also called 'blind touch'). Following cortical or subcortical lesions, patients with 
numbsense become completely anaesthetized on their right side. They have a complete lack of 
tactile experience. They are not able to detect, localize and describe tactile stimuli on their 
right arm, nor are they able to indicate on a picture of an arm where the stimulus was applied, 
even in a verbal forced choice condition. What is interesting is that despite their apparent 
numbness, they are able to accurately guide their opposite hand toward the specific site where 
they were touched when so instructed, and to their own surprise. Their bodily movements did 
not even improve their performance in verbal localization. When patients were asked both at 
                                                
11 For numbsense patients, see Paillard, Michel and Stelmach (1983) as well as Y. Rossetti, G. Rode and D. 
Boisson, “Implicit processing of somaesthetic information: a dissociation between where and how?” 
Neuroreport. 6 (1995): 506-10. For a description of KE and JO, see H.A. Anema, M.J. van Zandvoort, E.H. de 
Haan, L.J. Kappelle, P.L. de Kort, B.P. Jansen, H.C.  Dijkerman, “A double dissociation between somatosensory 
processing for perception and action”. Neuropsychologia. 47 (2009):1615-20. 
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the same time to verbally localize and to point to where they had been touched, they indeed 
became equally bad. In addition, they may be unaware of their arm location, and yet be able 
to accurately reach the position of their arm. Interestingly, this type of dissociation was 
known to Merleau-Ponty. He described the case of the patient Schneider who was unable to 
localize where a mosquito was stinging him, and yet, was able to scratch his leg where he was 
stung. 
When numbsense patients scratch their leg where they were stung, they must have 
mastered sensorimotor information about reaching their leg, scratching it and the effects of 
these actions. Yet, despite this sensorimotor knowledge, they feel nothing. Here, we have a 
clear case of a complete deficit of tactile and proprioceptive phenomenology with preserved 
spatial know-how. The case of numbsense therefore shows that spatial know-how (and its 
exercise) per se is not a sufficient condition of tactile and proprioceptive phenomenology.  
 
3.2 Action without perception, perception without action 
As said earlier, some versions of enactivism aim at explaining how perceptual experiences 
come to represent spatial properties, rather than explaining how they come to have a 
conscious phenomenology. Hence, it might be argued that the evidence provided by the 
numbsense case is of no relevance for these versions of the enactive view. More challenging 
for them is the following case of the patients KE and JO, who have tactile experiences, but 
whose tactile experiences are dissociated from spatial know-how, in the same way as visual 
experiences in optic ataxia and visual agnosia. 
KE and JO can both consciously feel a touch. In addition, they can accurately report the 
location of a visual target and point to it. Yet, when asked to point to where they were 
touched, they displayed a surprising double dissociation. They were asked either to point to 
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where they were touched on the hand (i.e. tactile-motor task) or to point to the location of the 
tactile stimulus on a pictorial map of their hand (i.e. abstract and detached perceptual report). 
It was found that JO failed to point accurately to the hand map, whereas she did not fail to 
point accurately to her own hand. Conversely, KE failed to point accurately to his own hand, 
but not to the hand map.  
In both cases, the spatial content of the tactile experiences does not match with the 
possession (or the deficit) of spatial know-how. JO experiences that she is touched, but she 
cannot report where she is touched. She merely experiences the touch ‘somewhere’, with no 
determinate spatial content. Yet, like numbsense patients, she is able to accurately get to the 
location of the touch on her own body. Hence, her spatial know-how does not suffice for 
providing her tactile experience with spatial content. By contrast, KE experiences and reports 
that he was touched on the hand in a specific location, but he is unable to get to the location of 
the touch on his own hand. Hence, there is no spatial know-how that could provide the spatial 
content of his tactile experience, and the tactile spatial content must have a different ground.12 
The case of JO shows that spatial know-how per se is not a sufficient condition of tactile 
spatial content, whereas the case of KE shows that it is not a necessary condition.  
To conclude, these dissociations show that the spatial information in the sensorimotor 
system can differ from the spatial information in the perceptual system. This leads us to infer 
that the sensorimotor system and the perceptual system cannot be reduced to one another. 
They are two distinct systems, one involved in action and the other involved in perceptual 
                                                
12 An enactivist may reply that there is no evidence of a deficit in spatial know-how in KE. There is only 
evidence of a deficit in spatial motor performance, and this does not systematically reveal a deficit in 
competence. If so, tactile spatial content could still be accounted for in terms of the supposedly preserved spatial 
know-how. However, this explanation of the results does not sound plausible. The patient KE has no motor 
deficit, as shown by his preserved ability to point to a hand map or to neutral visual targets. His results can 
neither be explained by a proprioceptive nor a memory deficit. In the study, the patients’ hands were moved 
passively to a different location and they were asked after two seconds to return their arms to the previously held 
position. KE’s performance in this proprioceptive task was similar to JO’s performance. It thus seems plausible 
to assume a deficit of spatial know-how in KE, which explains his poor motor performance when pointing to his 
own hand. 
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experiences. The dissociation between the two types of spatial information specific to each 
system can be made even more salient in the context of bodily illusions in healthy individuals.    
 
3.3 Illusory spatial content 
If spatial know-how provides the spatial content of perceptual experiences, then it should 
explain why this content can become illusory in healthy subjects. However, as said before, it 
was found that action can be immune to visual illusions. We shall see now that bodily 
illusions as well cannot be explained by mistaken information encoded in spatial know-how. I 
shall describe here the Rubber Hand Illusion, although similar results have been found in the 
vibrotactile illusion (i.e. the illusory kinaesthetic experience that one’s arm is stretching 
induced by biceps tendon vibration).13 
In the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), participants sit with their left arm resting on a table, 
hidden behind a screen. They are asked to fixate on a rubber hand presented in front of them, 
and the experimenter simultaneously strokes both the participant’s hand and the fake hand 
with two paintbrushes. After a short while, the majority of participants report that they feel 
the touch of the paintbrush in the location where they see the rubber hand touched. Even more 
surprisingly, they may feel as if the rubber hand were their own hand. At the behavioural 
level, participants report their hand as closer to the rubber hand than it really is. This is true 
only when the two hands are synchronously stimulated and in congruent positions.  
                                                
13 For a description of the standard Rubber Hand Illusion, see M. Botvinick and J. Cohen, “Rubber hands 
'feel' touch that eyes see”. Nature. 391 (1998): 756. For a description of the standard vibrotactile illusion, see 
J.R. Lackner and P.A. DiZio, “Aspects of body self-calibration”. Trends Cogn Sci. 4 (2000): 279-88. The 
immunity of action to the vibrotactile illusion was shown by M.P. Kammers, I.J. van der Ham and H.C. 
Dijkerman, “Dissociating body representations in healthy individuals: differential effects of a kinaesthetic 
illusion on perception and action”. Neuropsychologia. 44 (2006): 2430-2436. The immunity of action to the 
Rubber Hand Illusion was shown by M.P. Kammers, F. de Vignemont, L. Verhagen and H.C. Dijkerman, “The 
rubber hand illusion in action”. Neuropsychologia. 47 (2009): 204-11. 
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Now, the enactive view might account for the illusion in terms of erroneous spatial know-
how. The explanation may run as follows: participants feel their hand closer to the rubber 
hand because they were misleadingly induced to expect that if they reach the location close to 
the rubber hand, they will touch their own hand. However, a recent experiment refutes this 
explanation of the RHI. It was found that participants accurately directed their opposite hand 
to the real location of their own hand that was touched, and not to the illusory location that 
they reported. Their reaching movements were not sensitive to the spatial illusion. Similarly, 
when they performed the reverse movement (i.e. directing their touched hand toward their 
opposite hand), they had the right know-how of where their hand was. The complete absence 
of illusion was also confirmed in a bimanual task, where participants had to grasp a stick in 
front of them. Again, their bodily movements revealed accurate spatial information about the 
relationship between their two hands as well as the use of spatial know-how of their correct 
locations. When participants were asked a second time to make a perceptual judgment about 
the location of their touched hand after having moved, they were still sensitive to the RHI and 
they still experienced their hand as being closer to the rubber hand than it was.  
Although participants experienced their hand as being closer to the rubber hand than it 
was, they knew how to reach it and they knew where it was when asked to move it. Hence, 
the RHI cannot be explained by inaccurate spatial know-how. The illusory spatial content of 
the bodily experience is not determined by the illusion-immune spatial know-how, which 
reveals an accurate sense of the position of the touched hand.  
To sum up, in healthy individuals, like in patients, the spatial content of tactile and 
proprioceptive experiences can be dissociated from the spatial information encoded in spatial 
know-how used to guide reaching and pointing movements, such that one can be inaccurate in 
one and not the other, and vice-versa. Numbsense patients even illustrate the possibility of 
preserved know-how with no associated tactile sensation. Hence, it seems that spatial know-
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how, as recruited by reaching, pointing and grasping movements, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for bodily experiences.  
 
4. The dilemma 
In touch, like in vision, these various cases raise interesting questions for the enactive 
approach. It seems that at this stage, the enactive approach faces a dilemma. In a nutshell, if 
the enactive account of bodily experiences is in terms of spatial know-how, then it is false, 
because spatial know-how is separable from bodily experiences. If the enactive account is not 
in terms of spatial know-how, then it is unclear what type of sensorimotor expectancies could 
provide both the exteroceptive and the interoceptive spatial content of any kind of tactile 
experiences, including instantaneous passive touch. Let me briefly develop the two horns of 
the dilemma.   
On the first horn of the dilemma, the proponents of the enactive approach characterize the 
spatial content of tactile experiences in terms of the spatial know-how relative to the bodily 
location that has been touched (how to reach it or how to move it). But we have seen that this 
enactive account is challenged by a series of empirical results that reveal that contrary to what 
the enactive approach predicts, tactile experiences are separable from the perceiver’s actions. 
On the one hand, the possession of accurate spatial know-how does not guarantee that one 
consciously feels the touch (e.g., numbsense). Nor does it guarantee that the spatial content of 
bodily experiences is accurate (e.g., patient JO; Rubber Hand Illusion). On the other hand, the 
lack of spatial know-how does not guarantee that one has no bodily experience, nor that the 
bodily experience has no spatial content (e.g., patient KE). These results are difficult to 
accommodate for the enactive approach if it aims at explaining tactile experiences in terms of 
the procedural knowledge that is involved in reaching, pointing or scratching one’s body. 
What we feel is not determined by what we do, nor by what we know how to do. 
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On the second horn of the dilemma, the proponents of the enactive approach discount 
spatial know-how involved in such movements as irrelevant for an enactive account of bodily 
experiences. On this view, they claim to be interested in what perceptual experiences are 
grounded in, and not in what they are for.14 Hence, they reject these movements as mere 
“practical consequences” of the bodily experiences. The link between perception and such 
types of action is said to be only instrumental. It is thus no surprise if this type of spatial 
know-how is independent and dissociable from bodily experiences. However, if the 
proponents of the enactive view want to argue that spatial know-how does not involve the 
right kind of sensorimotor knowledge for bodily experiences, then they have to face several 
difficulties.  
First, they must explain why this type of relationship between perception and action is 
merely instrumental, rather than constitutive. Why couldn’t perceptual experiences be 
grounded in what they are for? It is unclear on what grounds the line between the ‘right’ type 
of procedural knowledge and the ‘wrong’ type of procedural knowledge is drawn. As already 
mentioned, an enactivist may reject reaching and pointing movements because they do not 
affect the tactile content in the same way that turning my head affects the visual content. 
However, this may be true of reaching, pointing and grasping movements, but not of 
scratching where there is a clear corresponding sensory consequence of one’s movements 
(e.g., if one scratches where one has been bitten, the stimulation decreases). Yet, we have seen 
that Merleau-Ponty’s patient Schneider had no conscious experience of the itching, although 
he could accurately scratch his leg. If this type of sensorimotor contingency is not included in 
the set of patterns of interdependence between stimulation and movement that constitutes 
itching experiences, then it is hard to see what would be. On the other hand, it is not clear that 
                                                
14 For this line of argument, see for instance Alva Noë, “Vision without representation”. In N. 
Gangopadhyay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer (eds), Perception, Action and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (in press). 
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enactivism can relinquish procedural knowledge that cannot be articulated in sensori-motor 
terms. Take the example of the experience of a flash of light. What is the enactive account for 
the temporal content of the visual experience (e.g., experience of a brief flash)? There is no 
corresponding sensory expectation of how one’s movements would affect the flash of light, 
given that the flash already belongs to the past. Furthermore, one cannot appeal to a 
counterfactual of the type “if the visual object were still here and if I did x, then it would have 
the visual consequence y”. Indeed this would not account for the brevity of the visual 
stimulus. Hence enactive explanations must sometimes accept procedural knowledge with no 
possible modification of the sensory signal. And if this is true for temporal content, why not 
for spatial content as well? Especially since the enactivist is left empty handed with no 
sensorimotor account of the spatial content of bodily experiences if she discounts spatial 
know-how. As I said in the beginning, it is highly unclear what sensorimotor 
contingencies are supposed to be in the case of passive touch, especially if the touch is very 
brief. One cannot simply highlight the importance of action for bodily experiences; one has to 
give a detailed account of the specific set of non-instrumental sensorimotor expectations that 
constitute bodily experiences. If the type of procedural knowledge that I offered here is not 
viewed as relevant for the enactive approach, then I would like to invite the proponents of 
such an approach to provide an alternative, which should be empirically testable.  
However, that might be an impossible task. As we have seen, the discounting of reaching, 
pointing, grasping and scratching movements supposes distinguishing between two types of 
procedural knowledge (constitutive and instrumental), and thus distinguishing between two 
distinct action systems, the action system that is constitutively linked to perceptual 
experiences and the action system that is not. If there are such dual sensorimotor systems, it 
should be possible to dissociate them, but one may wonder whether one sensorimotor system 
can be impaired while the other is preserved, or vice-versa. Alternatively, the enactivist has to 
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postulate that there is a unique action system, but that it exploits two distinct sets of spatial 
information about the location of the sensation, one of them being identical to the spatial 
content of bodily experiences.15 For instance, in the RHI, the location of the hand that was 
stroked would be encoded as 2 cm farther for one type of action than for another. The spatial 
information exploited by the motor system would thus not be internally consistent. This seems 
highly unlikely. As far as I know, there is no empirical validation of such a dissociation 
within the motor system. Any sensorimotor account of the specific location of a sensation has 
to involve an action that reveals a pinpointing of that location in the sensorimotor system. 
And it is unlikely that there can be two distinct sensorimotor systems, and not even two 
distinct sets of spatial information exploited by the sensorimotor system.  
To summarize, either the proponents of the enactive approach claim that bodily 
experiences are determined by spatial know-how involved in reaching and pointing 
movements or they do not make such a claim. If they do, then the version of the enactive 
account of bodily experiences that has the most plausibility is subject to the concerns I raised 
in this paper. If they do not, then the burden of proof is on the enactive side to distinguish 
between the sensorimotor knowledge that does and does not constitute bodily experience and 
to propose an alternative sensorimotor account of bodily experiences, which involves 
assuming the existence of two sensorimotor systems or of two distinct sets of spatial 
information exploited by the sensorimotor system. The enactive approach to bodily 
experiences thus suffers from serious flaws.  And if the enactive approach does not work for 
bodily experiences, which seem at first sight the less controversial example, then it is even 
less plausible that it works for visual experiences. 
 
                                                
15 There could be two different ways of presenting the same spatial information, for instance within two 
distinct frames of reference. But this is different from two different sets of spatial information. 
 22 
It has been suggested that vision evolved in the first place, not to provide conscious 
perceptual experiences, but to provide distal sensory control of movements. It is only later in 
evolution with the emergence of more and more complex behaviours that vision evolved to 
provide internal models of the world, stored in memory and accessible to other cognitive 
systems. Perception and action require different transformations of the visual signal. For 
instance, action requires on-line adjustments, whereas perception, which allows us to 
recognize objects, is concerned with enduring visual properties. In addition, action requires 
the object one acts upon to be localized relative to oneself within an egocentric frame of 
reference, whereas there is no such requirement for perception, which is able to make 
allocentric judgments on the relative locations of two objects. These distinctions result in the 
evolution of two visual systems, which most of the time interact, but are dissociable. 
Similarly, it seems that bodily information processing evolved to be used first for action, 
and only later for admiring oneself in the mirror. What is needed for action is different in 
many respects from what is needed for bodily experiences. As such, the very same bodily 
information is encoded in two different formats, and only one of them is linked to action. For 
instance, what is needed for action is constantly updated bodily information such that moment 
to moment one knows the posture of one’s body parts. By contrast, we have seen in the RHI 
study that participants still experience their hand as closer to the rubber hand after having 
moved it. This shows that their bodily experience had not been updated by proprioceptive 
information. These findings, among others, suggest that there are two functionally defined 
somatosensory systems, which interact most of the time, but are dissociable. One may further 
suggest that they lead to two distinct functionally defined representations of the body, the 
body schema for action (i.e. information about the body necessary to move such as posture, 
limb size, and strength) and the body image for perception (i.e. judgment of one’s own bodily 
properties). The dissociations in touch and proprioception show that vision is not an exception 
 23 
in the architecture of the mind. Other modalities, including touch and proprioception, use a 
dual coding based on the functional distinction between perception and action. The brain 
encodes information in distinct formats and the way it uses information determines the way it 
encodes it.16 
 
 
                                                
16 I am grateful to Ned Block and Pierre Jacob for their useful comments and their support.  
